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THE CIVIL JURY IN AMERICA
STEPHAN LANDSMAN*
I
AN INTRODUCTION—TEXAS STYLE
Americans have relied on juries of ordinary citizens to resolve their civil
disputes since the beginning of the colonial period.1  Juries were available in
virtually all civil, as well as criminal, cases in Virginia no later than 1624.2  They
were specifically provided for in the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties.3
Indeed, in seventeenth and eighteenth century Massachusetts, juries were the
primary instrument of governance.4  Those who ratified both the state and na-
tional constitutions viewed juries as a critical component of the justice system.
And juries have endured.  Today, men and women from all walks of life are still
called upon to resolve the most significant civil disputes confronting American
society.
This was the case in 1985 when Pennzoil and Texaco, two of America’s pet-
rochemical giants, clashed over the acquisition of Getty Oil, the corporate crea-
tion of billionaire J. Paul Getty.5  At Getty’s death, the assets of his company
had been divided between a family trust containing approximately forty per-
cent of outstanding shares, the Getty Museum, holding about eleven percent of
the company’s stock, and the public.  The trust was governed by Getty’s son
Gordon, the museum was directed by Harold Williams, and the oil company
was managed by CEO Sidney Peterson.  In 1984, a simmering dispute between
Gordon Getty and Sidney Peterson came to a head.  The two fought each other
for control of Getty Oil.  A key prize in their contest was the swing block of
shares controlled by the museum’s Williams.  Players representing all the inter-
ests in this high-stakes game engaged in a series of nasty tricks and betrayals
that degenerated into a no-holds-barred struggle for dominance.  The fight
eventually spilled over into the public arena where others interested in acquir-
ing Getty Oil might compete.  In Wall Street parlance, Getty Oil had been “put
in play” and might be seized by the highest bidder.
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Pennzoil, hoping to obtain control of Getty’s huge oil reserves, made an of-
fer of $100 per share for the company.  This bid was rejected as too low by
Getty’s board but led to further bargaining and an offer of $110 per share.  This
too was rejected.  Certain “sweeteners” were then added by Pennzoil resulting
in a final offer of approximately $112.50 per share.  This proposal was embed-
ded within a highly complex legal package that was accepted “in principle” by
the negotiating parties.  The deal was to be consummated through the drafting
of a series of contractual documents.  For a variety of reasons, the drafting
dragged on for several days.  During this delay, Texaco, which had been
watching developments, came forward with an offer that eventually totaled
$125 per share.  The Getty stockholders abandoned their agreement with Penn-
zoil and accepted Texaco’s proposal.
Pennzoil, believing it had been deprived of the fruits of a binding agree-
ment, decided to sue.  After preliminary legal skirmishing, Pennzoil and Texaco
squared off in Texas state court on the question of whether Texaco had im-
properly interfered with a completed Pennzoil deal.  The case, as required by
law, was to be heard by a jury of twelve ordinary Texans.  Their job was to de-
cide if Texaco ought to be required to pay compensatory and punitive damages
that might rise as high as $15 billion or more.
The case was assigned to Judge Anthony Farris.  As the trial date ap-
proached, Texaco discovered that Pennzoil’s lead attorney, the flamboyant
Texan Joseph Jamail, had contributed $10,000 to Judge Farris’s re-election
campaign, which was the largest single contribution received by the judge.
Texaco’s lawyers asked Judge Farris to recuse himself from the case but the
judge refused.  His decision was affirmed by a Texas appellate court.
The first step in the trial process was jury selection.  Before jurors were cho-
sen, the lawyers were given an opportunity to question potential panel mem-
bers about their possible biases.  This questioning process, or voir dire as it is
usually called, was effectively used by Jamail to lay out Pennzoil’s key trial
theme: that a deal, sealed with a handshake, had been consummated.  In re-
sponse, Texaco’s chief lawyer, Richard Miller, asked potential jurors whether
they could accept the limits imposed by law on corporate acquisitions and re-
ject as incomplete the complex series of negotiations carried on by Pennzoil
and Getty.  After questioning that took five days, the contending parties were
each allowed to remove by peremptory challenge as many as eight potential ju-
rors they suspected of being either biased or unsympathetic.  Pennzoil would
later claim that Texaco had tried to exclude African-Americans, although four
were empanelled, and Texaco would accuse Pennzoil of trying to remove Jews,
although at least one sat on the panel as originally constituted.
The simple handshake theme so effectively exploited by Jamail during voir
dire was diluted in Pennzoil’s eight-week presentation to the jury.  Pennzoil’s
case featured long and repetitive questioning, mind-numbing videotapes of pre-
trial witness examinations, and a mass of complex expert testimony including a
claim for $7.5 billion in damages.  Texaco did no better with its case.  Before it
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could conclude, however, Judge Farris became mortally ill and was replaced by
Judge Solomon Casseb.  In the end, the trial took a total of seventeen weeks,
involved thirty-five witnesses, and produced a transcript of more than 23,000
pages.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was given five questions (or
“special issues” in Texas parlance) to answer, including whether there had been
a Pennzoil-Getty contract, whether Texaco had interfered with that contract,
what damages might be assessed if interference were found, and what punitive
damages might be awarded.  On its initial vote on the first jury question, the
jury was divided seven to five in favor of Pennzoil.  It reached a nine to three
majority quickly but appeared stuck there.  The majority needed just one more
vote, because Texas law allows a nonunanimous verdict of ten to two.6  After a
weekend off, one juror switched sides and agreement was quickly reached on
all five questions (the two dissenting jurors eventually joined their ten col-
leagues).  The jury awarded Pennzoil $7.5 billion in compensatory damages and
$3 billion in punitive damages.
This $10.5 billion judgment threatened Texaco’s very existence.  Under
Texas law, defendants are required to post a bond in the total amount of the
award against them before being allowed to appeal.  In Texaco’s case, this
turned out to be a financial impossibility, because no one could or would write
such a bond.  Texaco turned to the federal courts for relief from the state court
judgment.  The question of federal intervention went all the way to the United
States Supreme Court, which denied that Texaco had any federal claim.7  Faced
with a crushing judgment, Texaco chose to declare bankruptcy.  In the ensuing
legal scramble, Pennzoil and Texaco came to a reluctant agreement in which
Pennzoil accepted a payment of $3 billion to settle the case.  A jury of twelve
ordinary Texans had brought one of the country’s largest and most powerful
corporations to its knees.
The Pennzoil case raises a host of questions about the function of the mod-
ern jury.  This article will explore a number of them, including why juries have
been given so important a place in the judicial process, and how the jury ought
to be constituted to carry out its work.  The article also examines the process
used to select a jury, instructions used to structure decisionmaking, and the na-
ture as well as the form of jury verdicts.  Despite many challenges to the jury
system, careful assessment suggests that the jury is still an effective and neces-
sary part of the judicial system.
II
WHY DO AMERICAN CIVIL JURIES HAVE SO MUCH POWER?
Looking at the Pennzoil case, one might be moved to ask (as were many
critics at the time):  Why does the United States allow twelve ordinary citizens
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to make such momentous decisions?  The answer to this question involves a
complex blend of historical and theoretical factors.  Chief among the theoreti-
cal considerations is that the United States relies on a robustly adversarial form
of justice.  This means that Americans trust neutral and passive bodies to ren-
der decisions on the basis of the sharp clash of proofs presented by adversaries
in a highly structured forensic setting.8
The jury is the most neutral and passive decisionmaker available.  It is not
called upon to rule on any pretrial disputes, nor is it involved in the administra-
tion of the lawsuit.  At trial, it hears only evidence that has been screened for
objectionable and prejudicial material.  Juries are made up of people who come
together to hear one case; they are, therefore, unlikely to be tainted by the sorts
of predispositions judges may develop over the course of their careers either
about certain sorts of claims or certain lawyers or litigants.  Because the jury
comprises a group, no single juror’s prejudices can destroy its ability to reach a
fair decision.  Moreover, its members may be questioned before trial in voir
dire, which facilitates the removal of potentially biased individuals.  All this is
to be contrasted with the position of trial judges, like Judge Farris, who have to
labor unceasingly to manage the litigation before them, who inescapably bring
their legal and political experiences into the courtroom with them, and who
cannot be questioned regarding their opinions or sympathies.
The United States’s allegiance to the civil jury is the product both of its
early colonial history and the constitutional debates at the conclusion of the
Revolutionary War.9  The jury trial came to the New World with the English
colonists and was, from the earliest times, the established means of resolving
legal disputes.  In the Revolutionary era, its value in American eyes was dra-
matically enhanced because juries regularly thwarted British objectives and
provided a bulwark against royal tyranny.  All the former colonies enthusiasti-
cally embraced the jury.  “The right to trial by jury was probably the only one
universally secured by the first American state constitutions.”10
When the initial draft of the United States Constitution failed to make a
specific provision for trial by jury in civil cases,11 a cry of protest went up across
the new nation.  The Federalists, who had been primarily responsible for
drafting the proposed constitution, were forced to defend their choice to omit
the civil jury trial right.  In pieces like Hamilton’s essay Number 83 in the Fed-
eralist, they argued that although valuable, the jury might not be essential, es-
                                                          
8. For a more complete description of America’s adversarial system, see STEPHAN LANDSMAN,
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held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”); cf. id. amend. VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”).
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pecially in civil cases.12  These and similar arguments were challenged by the
Antifederalists, who treated failure to insist on jury trials as sufficient reason to
reject the proposed constitution.  The Antifederalists believed that juries were
essential in both criminal and civil litigation to offset judicial power and
overzealous legislatures. They drew support for their argument from Black-
stone:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our prop-
erties, is the great end of civil society.  But if that be entirely entrusted to the magis-
tracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince or such as en-
joy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural
integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias toward those of their own rank and
dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature that the few should always be at-
tentive to the interests and good of the many.13
In the end, a compromise was reached:  The jury trial right in civil cases did
not appear in the body of the Constitution but was incorporated into that
document as part of the first ten amendments.  The Seventh Amendment de-
clares:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.14
Although much criticism has been leveled at the civil jury since 1791, it is
inextricably woven into the fabric of the American justice system.  It is the
counterweight to a powerful professional judiciary and the occasional, anti-
democratic tendencies of the various branches of government.
III
THE USE OF JURIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION TODAY
The jury remains a significant part of the United States’s civil justice sys-
tem.  The National Center for State Courts estimates that there are approxi-
mately 150,000 state jury trials per year.15  In the federal courts, there are about
10,000 jury trials a year, of which about half are civil.16  Civil jury trials in state
courts account for about one percent of all civil case dispositions.17  In the fed-
eral system, this figure was about two percent for 1990.18  Hundreds of thou-
sands of Americans serve on juries in any given twelve-month period.  In the
federal system alone, more than 400,000 citizens were involved in voir dire in
1990 and more than 100,000 were chosen to serve as jurors.19
                                                          
12. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
13. EHRLICH’S BLACKSTONE 682 (J.W. Ehrlich ed., Nourse Publishing Co. 1959).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
15. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DE-
MOCRACY 251 (1994).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 252.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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Although incomplete, there are data available that help us refine our pic-
ture of the civil jury at work.  In one of the primary areas of civil litigation—
torts—jury verdicts are returned in about 2.7% of all state court cases.20  Juries
do most of their tort work in simple cases involving auto accidents and prem-
ises liability claims.  Often these two categories account for fifty percent of the
total civil jury caseload.  Plaintiff win rates in tort cases vary widely, but in the
aggregate, plaintiffs win about half the time.  This figure drops to forty percent
in products liability actions and to thirty percent in medical malpractice cases.
Plaintiff win rates are virtually identical against individual and corporate de-
fendants but awards against corporations are, on average, substantially larger.
The median jury award in state courts is about $52,000, of which about half is
consumed in fees and costs.  Approximately eight percent of jury awards ex-
ceed one million dollars.  Punitive damage awards, as in Pennzoil, are infre-
quent and are most likely to be made in contract-related cases.  The median
punitive award in tort cases is quite modest ($38,000), but the mean is much
higher ($590,000) because of the existence of a number of very large awards.
The vast majority of tort plaintiffs are individuals rather than corporations.  A
typical state court trial usually takes about two years from case filing to jury
trial.
IV
THE QUESTION OF JURY SIZE
The Texas jury in the Pennzoil case had twelve jurors and four alternates.
One of the alternates eventually took the place of a juror who was excused—
thus ensuring that twelve jurors were present for deliberations.
From the late thirteenth century on, the Anglo-American legal system rec-
ognized that the jury should have twelve members, and, in the fifteenth cen-
tury, a twelve member jury definitively became the law of England, unless the
parties consented otherwise.21  In 1898, the United States Supreme Court held,
in Thompson v. Utah, that a “jury” in the constitutional sense of that term must
be “composed of not less than twelve persons.”22  The legal implication of this
decision was that all jury trials conducted under the mandate of either the Sixth
(criminal) or Seventh (civil) Amendment to the United States Constitution (at
a minimum all those trials conducted in federal court) had to utilize twelve-
person juries.  This requirement did not necessarily extend to all state court
civil jury trials—a question turning on a difficult question of constitutional in-
terpretation regarding the “incorporation” of various aspects of the Bill of
Rights into state proceedings.
                                                          
20. The data in this paragraph are drawn largely from Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anec-
dote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 234-40 (1996).
21. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Tri-
als, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8 (1993).
22. 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
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Over the past three decades, the requirement of twelve jurors has come un-
der sustained attack.  In 1970, the Supreme Court, in Williams v. Florida, up-
held a Florida statute mandating six-person juries in all state court criminal
prosecutions except those involving the possible imposition of the death pen-
alty.23  In the Williams decision, the Supreme Court referred to reliance on
twelve jurors as an “historical accident”24 and, in an act of analytical oversimpli-
fication, declared the only essential purpose of the criminal jury to be the pre-
vention of oppression by government.25  Based on the assumption that the jury
was necessary only to serve this one purpose, the Court could discern no differ-
ence between the effectiveness of six- and twelve-person juries and, therefore,
upheld the use of a six-person panel.26  Three years later, the Court extended
the six-person rule to federal civil trials in Colgrove v. Battin.27  This decision
was particularly noteworthy because the requirements of the Seventh Amend-
ment specifically applied to the federal civil trial under consideration in that
case.  The court thus declared that whatever the term “jury” had once meant, it
was no longer to be defined as a body of twelve.  This redefinition opened the
way to significant downsizing.
The Court in Colgrove, in passing, noted that its analysis was supported by
“convincing empirical evidence.”28  Later examination would disclose that this
evidence was hardly empirical and far from convincing.29  In fact, research
would strongly suggest that smaller juries are no more efficient than larger
ones30 (efficiency was an important selling point for the Supreme Court major-
ity in Colgrove), that the use of smaller juries is likely to lead to more wildly
fluctuating verdicts,31 that smaller panel size reduces the opportunity for mi-
nority jurors to serve,32 and that smaller juries place added pressure on minority
jurors who do serve to surrender to the majority point of view.33
As evidence mounted regarding the inferiority of six-person panels, the
court was confronted with a Georgia effort to reduce the size of its criminal ju-
ries to five.  In Ballew v. Georgia, the Supreme Court rejected five member ju-
                                                          
23. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
24. Id. at 89.
25. See id. at 100.
26. See id.
27. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
28. Id. at 159 n.15.
29. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, “Convincing Empirical Evidence” on the Six
Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974).
30. See William R. Pabst, Jr., Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries,
14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 326, 327 (1972); Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminu-
tion of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 710-12 (1971).
31. See Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE
263, 264 (1996).
32. See Michael J. Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18, 19;
Zeisel, supra note 30, at 716.
33. See Development in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1485-86 & n.165
(1997).
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ries as constitutionally inadequate in criminal cases.34  Justice Blackmun’s ex-
planation for the court’s decision suggested that a line had to be drawn some-
where.35
The research Blackmun relied on, however, suggests that the line should
have been drawn at twelve, not between five and six.  Nevertheless, in 1996, the
Judicial Conference of the United States rejected the recommendation of its
own Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure that the federal
courts return to twelve-person juries in all civil cases.36
V
SELECTING A JURY IN A CIVIL CASE—VOIR DIRE, PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES, AND JURY CONSULTANT ADVICE
In the Pennzoil case, the opposing lawyers spent five days questioning po-
tential jurors about their sympathies.  After this voir dire, each side used its
eight peremptory strikes to remove those individuals who were perceived to be
biased or unsympathetic.  These two processes, voir dire and peremptory
strikes, are at the heart of the civil juror selection system; however, each has
become controversial over the last quarter-century.
Lawyer-conducted voir dire is the traditional American method of screen-
ing the members of the panel called for jury service.37  In some states, voir dire
has been left so completely in lawyers’ hands that the judge does not even pre-
side at the sessions in which opposing lawyers question potential jurors.  Over
the course of the past two decades, however, the feeling has grown among
judges and rules drafters alike that lawyers have been abusing voir dire to in-
doctrinate the jury and to cultivate friendly relationships with individual jurors.
Moreover, critics of the traditional approach have suggested that lawyer-
directed questioning is inordinately time consuming and likely to veer into in-
appropriate areas touching on jurors’ private lives and specific views about evi-
dence they have not yet heard.
In reaction to the feeling that lawyers have abused voir dire, various courts
have imposed substantial restrictions on lawyer participation in the questioning
process.  In the federal courts, the civil rules today authorize judges to conduct
the entire voir dire themselves.38  Federal judges have exercised their rule-
granted authority and in about seventy percent of cases conduct all voir dire
alone.39  This approach has yielded remarkably mechanical questioning that
seldom vigorously pursues the issue of bias.  Moreover, research suggests that
                                                          
34. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
35. See id. at 239.
36. See Development in the Law—The Civil Jury, supra note 33, at 1478 & nn.106-08.
37. For a general review of voir dire, see Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Won-
derful Power,” 27 STAN. L. REV.  545 (1975).
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a).
39. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 54 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997).
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judges are not as effective at eliciting juror self-disclosure as are lawyers.40  De-
spite these drawbacks, voir dire has, more and more, become the judge’s prov-
ince.
Two techniques have been developed in recent years that promise to rein-
vigorate voir dire while restraining lawyer excesses.  The first of these is to al-
low lawyer supplementation of the judge’s questioning, thereby making it pos-
sible to secure both the benefit of judicial restraint and lawyer probing.  Such
an approach is authorized by the rules of procedure and is becoming more
popular.41  The second technique is to supplement oral voir dire with a written
questionnaire answered by each potential juror.  Questionnaires have been
used in a number of high-profile civil trials, including the massive litigation re-
garding the safety of the pregnancy drug Bendectin, where a forty-six question
form was distributed to potential jurors before oral voir dire began.42
Once voir dire has been concluded, each side is allowed to exercise its per-
emptory strikes.  These strikes have, traditionally, been exercised without ex-
planation or justification.  As in a number of other areas, the Supreme Court
has challenged tradition, in this instance by requiring that at least certain per-
emptory strikes be scrutinized and, in some circumstances, justified by counsel.
The case requiring such scrutiny was the 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky.43
In that criminal case, the Court held that it was improper for lawyers to use
peremptory strikes to remove African-American juror candidates simply be-
cause of their race.  The Court mandated a three-step process beginning with
the complaining party making a “prima facie [showing] of purposeful discrimi-
nation” based on race.44  Once the complainant has made such a showing, the
burden shifts to the party who exercised the peremptory strikes to articulate a
“neutral explanation” for his or her selections.45  Then it is up to the trial court
to decide whether unlawful discrimination has been proven.  Subsequent cases
have expanded and contracted Batson by turns.  The Supreme Court has ex-
tended Batson protection to juror candidates in civil actions46 and to peremp-
tory challenges that discriminate on the basis of gender.47  The Court has, how-
ever, given trial courts virtually unfettered discretion in deciding Batson
claims,48 thereby declining to fix any firm or predictable guidelines.  It remains
to be seen whether Batson and its progeny will rein in discrimination in the use
                                                          
40. See Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation
of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1987).
41. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 39, § III-1 (lawyer-conducted voir dire).
42. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. “Bendectin” Prod. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp 1212, 1258
(S.D. Ohio 1985).
43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
44. Id. at 93-94.
45. Id. at 97-98.
46. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (prohibiting private litigants
in a civil case from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race).
47. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam).
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of peremptory challenges.  In the Pennzoil case, each side accused the other of
Batson violations, but the accusations were rejected.
The task of selecting jurors has become increasingly difficult as America’s
population has grown, the diversity of the jury pool has increased, and lawyers
with a national practice find themselves more frequently trying lawsuits in
communities they do not know.  In these circumstances, at least when the
stakes are high, lawyers will be attracted by any technique that offers the pros-
pect of making more effective juror selections possible.
Since the early 1970s, one method said to “improve” jury selection has be-
come increasingly popular.49  This is the so-called “scientific selection” of ju-
rors, which relies on the input of social scientists, or those claiming social sci-
ence expertise (“jury consultants”), to help lawyers exercise their peremptory
strikes.  In the 1971 case of the Harrisburg Seven, a group of anti-Vietnam War
protestors, Dr. Jay Schulman and a number of confederates sought to use social
science methods to help the defense select a more sympathetic jury in the gen-
erally hostile community of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  To do this, the scientists
conducted an opinion poll in the Harrisburg area, analyzed it in a search for
correlations between favorable juror attitudes and demographic traits, and used
a variety of in-court observational techniques to help counsel make their jury
selections.  When the ensuing trial ended in a jury deadlocked ten to two for
acquittal, a new science (or, more accurately, business) was born.
The new business is premised on the notion that statistical assessment of
community attitudes can significantly improve the identification of favorable
jurors.  If true, jury trials might be reduced to contests to see whose social sci-
entists are better at profiling favorable jurors.  Fortunately for the jury system,
such a scenario is unsupported by careful research.  First, the overwhelming
majority of decisions are dictated by the weight of the evidence rather than any
trait of the jurors.50  It is almost always the way the witnesses and proof sound
that makes or breaks a case.  Second, the most significant benefit to be derived
from the use of jury consultants is not related to peremptories at all but to the
pretrial rehearsal and critique such consultants provide for lawyers.51  Third,
careful assessment of the link between demographic traits (age, sex, race, edu-
cational background, employment, etc.) and juror decisions suggests that, even
under optimum conditions, jury selection will not be improved by more than
ten percent over traditional methods.52
Despite all this, great concern has been expressed about scientific jury se-
lection, and, at least in one sense, that concern is justified.  Such methods
                                                          
49. On scientific jury selection, see generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE
JURY 79-94 (1986).
50. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (1988).
51. See Ross P. Laguzza, Voodoo Jurynomics, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 9, 1997, at 6.
52. See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of
Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV.  703, 719-20 (1991).
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clearly rely on demographic stereotypes,53 the very thing that has been con-
demned in some contexts by Batson and its progeny.  Moreover, effective or
not, such techniques give the impression that favorable juries can be bought,54
as was suggested in the aftermath of the William Kennedy Smith rape trial.  It
remains to be seen whether any restrictions should be imposed on the use of
jury consultants.
VI
TRYING CIVIL CASES
Pennzoil’s lawsuit against Texaco resulted in a seventeen-week trial with
thirty-five witnesses and a great deal of highly technical expert testimony.55  It
was, by virtually any measure, a complex case.  Many critics of the civil jury
have suggested that one of the jobs it cannot satisfactorily perform is the reso-
lution of such complicated matters.  It may be well and good for the jury to re-
solve simple disputes, so the argument goes, but it is a serious mistake to let a
group of laymen decide the fate of giant corporations or ponder weeks of eso-
teric expert testimony.  In Pennzoil, there was a chorus of complaints of exactly
this sort when the jury’s $10.5 billion award was announced.  What few of the
critics noted was the fact that Texaco offered no evidence on damages and did
not in any way help the jury assess the punitive question.  Whatever one thinks
of the Pennzoil decision, the case typifies the new breed of information-
intensive, expert-populated, lengthy cases that critics suggest juries should
never be allowed to decide.
Under the Seventh Amendment, most civil actions involving monetary
claims filed in federal courts must be tried by a jury if either party so requests.
However, at least one federal court of appeals has indicated that if a case is too
complex, it is unfair, and a violation of the Fifth Amendment right to due proc-
ess, to insist that a jury hear the matter.56  This complexity exception to the
right to jury trial in civil cases has not been reviewed by the Supreme Court,
but at least one other federal circuit court has denied the existence of such an
exception.57
The most significant problem with a complexity exception is that over the
long run it is likely to swallow the jury trial right.  Almost every substantial
lawsuit will have something difficult or complicated in it.  To bar the jury from
such cases is to invite their ouster from all meaningful civil litigation.  More-
over, a complexity exception fails to take into account the difficulties a lone
judge may have in dealing with a complex case.  There is little basis to assume
that the judge will be any more effective than a properly informed group of ju-
                                                          
53. See ABRAMSON, supra note 15, at 146-47.
54. See id. at 149.
55. With respect to details of the Pennzoil litigation, see generally PETZINGER, supra note 5.
56. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
57. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979).
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rors.  Professor Richard Lempert, a lawyer and sociologist, has made another
telling point about complexity:
A close look at a number of cases, including several in which jury verdicts appear mis-
taken, does not show juries that are befuddled by complexity.  Even when juries do
not fully understand technical issues, they can usually make enough sense of what is
going on to deliberate rationally, and they usually reach defensible decisions.  To the
extent that juries make identifiable mistakes, their mistakes seem most often attribut-
able not to conditions uniquely associated with complexity, but to the mistakes of
judges and lawyers, to such systematic deficiencies of the trial process as battles of ex-
perts and the prevalence of hard-to-understand jury instructions, and to the kinds of
human error that affect simple trials as well.  The anecdotal evidence should also re-
mind us that it is difficult to predict which complex cases will trouble juries and which
they will handle well.58
In light of the Supreme Court’s avoidance of the issue, it does not appear
that entire trials are likely at the present time to be treated as too complex for
jury adjudication; yet there is some indication that specific issues raised in cer-
tain cases may be kept from juries because of their complex nature.  On the
strength of such an assessment, the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc.59 unanimously concluded that in patent infringement cases the
judge retains responsibility for construing the patent’s language, despite a
finding that the jury trial right is applicable.60  This decision was based, in part,
on a functional assessment that concluded “judges . . . are better suited to find
the acquired meaning of patent terms.”61  Although the jury was left to decide
the question of infringement, the Supreme Court’s focus on judicial compe-
tence and juror limitations may signal future receptivity to the narrowing of
jury responsibility in areas other than the language of patents.
Comparable attitudes may explain judicial reliance in difficult or complex
cases on a procedure generally referred to as bifurcation (meaning a cutting
into two pieces).  Pursuant to this approach, exposure to certain issues in a case
may be delayed until the jury has decided a number of preliminary questions.
This sequenced approach to trial has been popular in cases concerning such
questions as exposure to toxic chemicals, involvement in a mass disaster, and
injury from a potentially dangerous product.  It has also frequently been con-
sidered in cases containing claims for punitive damages.  In all these situations,
bifurcation serves to screen the jury from arguably prejudicial information
about the extent of a claimant’s injury or the scope of a defendant’s wrongdo-
ing until preliminary questions like responsibility for manufacture or confor-
mity to industry-wide standards have been answered.
It has been argued in bifurcation’s behalf that it simplifies the jurors’ task
by placing one issue before them at a time and eliminating exposure to poten-
tially biasing or confusing information until absolutely necessary to the resolu-
                                                          
58. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 234 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
59. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
60. See id. at 391.
61. Id. at 388.
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tion of that issue.  Research suggests that while bifurcation is helpful in some
situations, it is no panacea.  It has been found to increase significantly the per-
centage of defendant victories.62  Paradoxically, it has also been found to in-
crease the likelihood of large punitive awards.63
Juries are expected to decide the case presented to them on the strength of
the evidence adduced by the contending parties.  The introduction of evidence
is regulated by a series of rules circumscribing the use of certain sorts of proof.
The most important evidence restrictions require that only relevant materials
be presented in court and that prejudicial materials be excluded.64  The judge
must serve as gatekeeper by deciding what is relevant and what is prejudicial.
In the course of making those decisions, the judge is, of course, exposed to the
challenged proofs.  Preliminary psychological investigation suggests that the
judge may, unwittingly, be biased by what she or he hears.65  One of the values
of the jury is that it will not, generally, be exposed to prejudicial material and,
therefore, will be more likely to decide cases without the biases with which
judges must contend.  A famous study by legal scholars Harry Kalven, Jr., and
Hans Zeisel concluded that judicial exposure to inadmissible prejudicial mate-
rials concerning criminal defendants’ prior records clearly affected judges’
judgments about guilt and innocence and led them to decide more cases against
defendants than untainted juries did.66
Many of the rules of evidence operate on psychological assumptions about
how jurors will react to various sorts and forms of proof.  It is assumed by the
rules that things like criminal records are powerfully biasing, both in criminal
and civil litigation67—leading juries to decide against those who have been pre-
viously convicted.68  This assumption has been borne out in a variety of experi-
ments.69  Another assumption made by the rules is that hearsay (the in-court
use of material from a person not available for cross-examination) will be over-
valued by jurors.  For this reason, among others, hearsay is usually barred from
being introduced.  However, experimental testing suggests that this assumption
may not be warranted and that jurors instinctively tend to discount hearsay ma-
                                                          
62. See Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1612 (1963).
63. See Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish for: The Paradoxical Effects of Bifur-
cating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297, 329-30 (finding large punitive damages in
cases where a jury reaches the punitive issue after having decided against the defendant on the pre-
liminary question of liability).
64. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403 & advisory committee note.
65. See Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Poten-
tially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125
(1994).
66. See HARRY KALVEN  JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 121-33 (1966).
67. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (allowing court to admit evidence of a conviction only if it determines
that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect).
68. See id. advisory committee note.
69. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficiency of Limiting Instructions:
When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9  LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
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terials.70  Be that as it may, American courts tend to shield jurors from this form
of proof.
For much of the last century, it was felt that members of the jury panel
should remain absolutely passive during the trial of a case.71  Pursuant to this
view, it was believed that jurors should neither be allowed to take notes nor ask
questions.  Furthermore, they were strictly prohibited from discussing the case
before the evidentiary presentation was concluded.  These precepts consigned
jurors to almost total inactivity, increasing the risks of inattention and disen-
gagement.
Recently, there has been a substantial shift in thinking about juror passivity.
A number of judges and scholars have attacked the idea and have suggested
that jurors should be encouraged to participate more actively in the trial proc-
ess.  To this end, many courts have embraced juror note-taking.72  In addition,
some courts have adopted a somewhat more controversial step by allowing ju-
rors to present judges with written questions that the judges may screen and ask
if appropriate.73  This is more controversial because of the risks that jurors may
come to see themselves as advocates or seek answers to improper or prejudicial
questions.74  Both these techniques have been adopted in an effort to engage ju-
rors more fully in the trial of the case they are to decide.75  Perhaps the most
radical proposal along these lines is to allow jurors to discuss the lawsuit while
it is in the process of being tried.  The risks herepremature decision, loss of
neutrality, and heightened inter-juror conflictare serious; nevertheless, some
courts have begun experiments to determine the usefulness of such discus-
sions.76  It would appear that America is moving toward a new jury concept, one
based on the active engagement of jurors in the cases they hear.
It should be noted, however, that there are countervailing trends in the law
regulating juror conduct.  Some recent legislation has attempted to blindfold
jurors by depriving them of a number of critical pieces of information as they
hear and decide cases.  The Illinois legislature, for example, has sought to hide
from jurors the fact that a plaintiff in a tort case will be barred from all recov-
ery if he or she is found more than fifty percent responsible for the accident in
question as well as the fact that there are legal ceilings on noneconomic and
punitive damages.77  Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that juries should not be informed of the rule that dam-
                                                          
70. See Richard Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings,
General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REV. 655 (1992).
71. For a careful examination of the issues of note-taking and question-asking, see Larry Heuer &
Steven Penrod, Juror Note Taking and Question Asking During Trials, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121
(1994).
72. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 39, § V-6 (juror note-taking).
73. See id. § V-7 (juror questions to witnesses).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 142, 145.
76. See id. § V-5 (juror discussions of evidence during the trial).
77. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1107.1 (West 1992).
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age awards in civil antitrust cases under the Clayton Act will be trebled.78
These and similar blindfolding exercises seek to keep the consequences of their
decisions from jurors, apparently on the assumption that doing so will help to
control or steer those decisions.  Such an assumption conceptualizes jurors as
passive sponges, who will “soak up” only what they are permitted and then
“squeeze” out a decision.  Such an image is deeply flawed and often yields
skewed and unsatisfactory results distorted by juror speculation about embar-
goed information concerning legal consequences.  Dr. Shari Diamond and Pro-
fessor Jonathan Casper have studied blindfolding and concluded:  “When ju-
rors are taken seriously and efforts are made to deal with their concerns and
expectations, that is, when they are treated as active co-participants rather than
passive sponges, they appear to be willing and able to respond more appropri-
ately to the dictates of legal rules.”79
VII
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AT THE END OF THE CASE
Once all the evidence has been presented, it is the judge’s job to inform the
jury of the law to be used in deciding the case.  Depending on the practice of
the locality, the judge may do this either before or after the lawyers have been
given an opportunity to make their closing arguments; traditionally, instruc-
tions come last.80  In the federal courts, since at least 1895 and probably a good
bit earlier, it has been insisted that it is the jury’s duty in a criminal case “to
take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to
be from the evidence.”81  This view is clearly at odds with the proposition that
the jury may reject or “nullify” the law.  The question of nullification is ex-
plored in another piece included in this symposium.82
In most cases, the judge’s legal instructions are drawn from previously
drafted models.83  Quite often, these models are produced by officially consti-
tuted groups of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars whose primary goal is to re-
flect as accurately and fully as possible the current state of the law.  What these
so-called pattern instructions have generally lacked is concision and plain Eng-
lish.  They tend to be long, repetitive, and filled with legal jargon.  It has gener-
ally been thought more important that instructions be complete than compre-
hensible.
                                                          
78. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498
F.2d 1240, 1242 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Caspor, Blindfolding
the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513, 517-
18 (1992).
79. Diamond & Caspor, supra note 78, at 558.
80. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 39, at 161.
81. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
82. See Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 50-53
(Spring 1999).
83. On the question of jury instructions, see HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 49, at 120-27.
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Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, such attitudes have produced instruc-
tions that are difficult for jurors to understand.  In an archival study of 400
cases from the State of Washington, it was discovered that about one quarter of
all juries halted their deliberations to request judicial clarification of one or
more instructions.84  It should be noted that in virtually all these cases the
courts refused to elaborate on the original instructions provided.85  Experimen-
tal work regarding the comprehensibility of instructions has found that jurors
frequently fail to understand what instructions are saying.86
In light of such findings, a number of lawyers and scholars have asked what
steps might be taken to improve juror understanding of instructions.  Several
quite simple steps that have been proposed have focused on the timing of the
delivery of instructions and the format of their presentation.87  As things now
stand, jurors are usually given instructions only once—after all the evidence has
been heard and the lawyers have made their closing arguments.  This arrange-
ment keeps jurors in the dark about the law throughout the case and allows
them only a single chance to learn about its requirements.  If relevant instruc-
tions were given at the start of the case or before final arguments, jurors would
be afforded extra opportunities to consider the law’s import and apply it to the
facts.  Moreover, lawyers would have a clearer picture of the law being pre-
sented to the jury and could more effectively tailor their proof and remarks to
the legal principles laid down.  On the question of format, it was traditionally
believed that the proper way to instruct a jury was by means of a single oral
recitation of the law.  Jurors were not given a copy of the instructions but were
expected to reconstruct the law from memory.  Recent practice has moved
away from this approach by providing jurors with a written copy of instructions.
The supplying of written copies (or, in some cases, tape recordings) facilitates
jury review during deliberations, enhances the accuracy of recollection of legal
requirements, and focuses jurors on the precise legal questions to be resolved.
Beyond these simple steps, a number of reformers have set about the task
of rewriting a vast array of legal instructions in plain English.  It has been the
hope of the drafters that the rewritten instructions will more effectively com-
municate the law’s goals and requirements.  Judges have not been particularly
receptive to rewritten instructions.88  As one group of commentators has put it:
“It is as if the courts prefer not to communicate clearly to their juries.”89
While, at first blush, this may seem an absurd attitude, there are several
considerations that may help us understand it.  First, the present pattern in-
                                                          
84. See Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Compre-
hend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 153, 172 (1982).
85. See id.
86. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 12 (1982);
Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1358 (1979).
87. On the question of the improvement of jury instructions, see JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, su-
pra note 39, §§ VI-1 to VI-11.
88. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 50, at 152.
89. Id.
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structions have been carefully vetted and accepted by appellate courts.  If they
are used, there is little danger of appellate reversal.  The same may not be true
of plain English replacements.  Until such time as the substitutes are officially
endorsed, they remain a legally risky choice.  Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, the present instructions often represent a compromise about difficult le-
gal questions, granting each contending interest some part of its objective.  This
fine balance of interests is likely to be undone by plain English instructions.
Indeed, research suggests that changing the wording of instructions often has a
profound impact on the percentages of plaintiff and defendant victories.90  If
outcomes are likely to be affected, then redrafting is a far from neutral exercise
and poses serious social and political questions.
VIII
VERDICT FORMS AND SPECIAL VERDICTS
Along with its instructions, a court may specify what sort, or form, of ver-
dict a jury must reach in order to resolve a civil case.  There are, essentially,
three forms of verdict possible: a general verdict, a general verdict with inter-
rogatories, and a special verdict.  The most frequently used form is the general
verdict, which leaves all questions about the legal and factual merits in the ju-
rors’ hands.  It asks the jury only to declare which side has prevailed and fix
damages, if appropriate.  This form cedes the jury maximum authority.  Jurors
do not have to explain or justify their decision in any way.
General verdicts with interrogatories take a significant step away from jury
control toward judicial management and oversight.  The jury is still asked to
deliver a verdict but is also required to answer a series of supplemental ques-
tions.  These questions focus on the factual underpinnings of the verdict and
require the jurors to specify a number of their factual conclusions.  The jury’s
responses allow the court to scrutinize the soundness of the panel’s reasoning.
If the interrogatory answers are consistent with the verdict rendered, then the
judgment is fully validated.91  If the verdict is inconsistent with the interrogato-
ries but the interrogatories are internally consistent, the court may enter a ver-
dict on the interrogatories, ask the jury to deliberate further, or order a new
trial.  When the interrogatories are internally inconsistent, the jury may be
asked to deliberate further or a new trial may be required.  The point of the ex-
ercise is to make sure that the jurors have understood the case and rationally
integrated facts and law.  The general verdict with interrogatories is viewed as
particularly useful in complex cases.
The special verdict is a device which shifts even more responsibility to the
court.  When used, it requires that jurors answer a series of special questions
about the facts of a case.  The court then uses these answers to determine the
                                                          
90. See generally Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 IND. L.J. 1281 (1993); Walter W.
Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 77 (1988).
91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
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legal outcome.  The special verdict removes the jury’s ultimate decisionmaking
power.  This restrictive device, obviously, raises serious questions about respect
for the civil jury as an adjudicatory body.
IX
JURY DECISIONS—UNANIMOUS OR NOT?
By the fourteenth century, if not before, it was agreed that jury verdicts
should be unanimous—that all jurors should agree on a decision or the case
should be retried.  This proposition was specifically embraced by the United
States Supreme Court in 1897 in American Publishing Co. v. Fisher.92  American
Publishing stood until 1972, when, in reviewing a pair of state criminal deci-
sions, the Supreme Court held that less than unanimous verdicts are constitu-
tionally permissible in state court convictions.93  In Apodaca v. Oregon,94 the
Court upheld an eleven-to-one verdict in an assault with a deadly weapon
case,95 while in Johnson v. Louisiana,96 a nine-to-three conviction regarding a
robbery charge was accepted.97  As had been the case in their jury size deci-
sions, the Supreme Court attributed the most narrowly circumscribed functions
to the jury—claiming that the criminal jury does little more than serve as a
counterbalance to the exercise of official power by the government.  As the Su-
preme Court saw it, the size of the jury majority has little to do with containing
government overreaching.  The court also argued that unanimity is another his-
torical accident that can be disposed of in the name of efficiency; the efficiency
here being the avoidance of hung juries, at least down to the nine-to-three
level.
Today, more than thirty states permit nonunanimous verdicts in civil cases.98
Interestingly, only two, Oregon and Louisiana, allow such decisions in felony
prosecutions.  Due to an anomaly regarding interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment, federal courts are still required to seek unanimous verdicts in civil
cases.
One of the first questions that comes to mind about the nonunanimity rule
is whether there is any limit whatsoever on how small the majority must be to
satisfy constitutional constraints.  In criminal matters, the Supreme Court has
provided at least a partial answer.  In Burch v. Louisiana,99 the Court held that
conviction by a vote of five to one is unacceptable because it yields less than six
votes for conviction, thereby, arguably, offending the six-person jury rule ar-
                                                          
92. 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
93. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
94. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
95. See id. at 406.
96. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
97. See id. at 358-59.
98. See Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Ver-
dicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1997).
99. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
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ticulated in Ballew v. Georgia.100  Still unanswered are questions about the va-
lidity of votes like eight to four and seven to five.  These numerical questions
point up the absence of any principled rationale for the Supreme Court’s pref-
erence, since it appears to rely on neither historical tradition nor authoritative
empirical assessment.
In fact, the empirical data on nonunanimous juries suggest that such juries
do not function as well as their unanimous counterparts.  Reid Hastie and his
colleagues in a book-length study published by the Harvard University Press
detailed a series of alarming findings about nonunanimous juries.101  First, they
discovered that majority rule juries virtually always cease serious deliberations
once they have reached the required majority for decision.102  Moreover, the
smaller the size of the required majority, the faster the deliberations.103  For ex-
ample, juries that needed only to reach an eight to four verdict in a particular
mock case deliberated seventy-five minutes on average, while their unanimous-
jury counterparts needed 138 minutes, and ten-to-two juries needed 103 min-
utes.104  Perhaps most troubling, majority rule juries felt significantly less certain
about the correctness of their decisions and the winning majority tended to
“adopt a more forceful, bullying, persuasive style” of deliberating.105
What is lost under a nonunanimous rule, suggests Jeffrey Abramson, is re-
spect for genuine and robust deliberations as well as a commitment to strive for
real consensus.106  The loss of all this undermines the deliberative ideal, thereby
challenging the central purpose of the jury—to have the entire community
meaningfully contribute to the search for justice in our courts.  Under a major-
ity rule regime, minority viewpoints and contributions may be marginalized or
even disregarded altogether.
X
POSTVERDICT REVIEW
A jury’s decision is subject to review both at the trial court level and on ap-
peal.  After a verdict has been returned, the losing party may ask the trial judge
for any one of a number of different forms of relief.  The process of trial court
review has its roots in eighteenth century common law procedure and was well
established by the time the United States Constitution was adopted, thereby
bringing such review into conformity with the Seventh Amendment’s require-
ment that facts tried by a jury not be “otherwise re-examined [except] accord-
ing to the rules of the common law.”107
                                                          
100. See id. at 138.
101. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
102. See id. at 95.
103. See id. at 60, 76.
104. See id. at 60.
105. Id. at 112.
106. See ABRAMSON, supra note 15, at 183.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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The primary sort of relief available for a fatally flawed jury decision is a
new trial of the case before a new jury.108  This may be ordered if the trial judge
feels she or he has committed a serious error with respect to such matters as
jury instructions or the application of the rules of evidence.  Alternatively, a
judge may grant a new trial if jurors may be shown to have seriously misbe-
haved, for example, by considering evidence not presented at trial.  Finally, the
trial court may grant a new trial if the verdict is against “the clear weight of the
evidence.”109  This last ground is generally said to be available only when the
original decision is manifestly unjust.  A new trial may not be ordered simply
because a judge disagrees with the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a wit-
ness or the weight of the evidence; instead, it must be dictated by the over-
whelming weight of all the proof taken together.
The reviewing judge may use several alternative procedures rather than re-
quiring a new trial.  She or he may grant judgment to the losing party (called a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict) if such a result is the only one rationally
possible.  Alternatively, the judge may insist that a new trial be held unless the
plaintiff accepts a reduction in the damages award (remittitur) or, in rare cases,
the defendant agrees to an increase in the award (additur).
Despite this impressive array of possible responses to jury error, trial courts
are expected to respect jury decisions.  The case law regarding review stresses
the latitude a jury has in assessing the believability of the witnesses and persua-
siveness of the proof.  Inquiring into the mental processes of jurors after the
rendering of a verdict is prohibited.110  The rules regarding appellate court re-
versal are even more circumscribed.  When an appellate court reviews a jury’s
decision about the facts of a case, it is limited to asking whether “the jury
‘might reasonably’ have found as it did.” 111  If there is some basis for the jury’s
choice, it must be upheld.
XI
CONCLUSION
The American civil jury is vested with enormous power and responsibility.
Its authority touches virtually all sorts of civil disputes.  Despite substantial
modification of a number of jury mechanisms over the past several decades, the
jury still occupies the exalted place originally envisioned for it in the Seventh
Amendment.  When the likes of Texaco and Pennzoil prepare for legal combat,
it is likely they will be required to make their case before a group of ordinary
citizens called away from their normal tasks to decide the most momentous
questions of the day.
                                                          
108. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 382 (4th ed. 1992).  Much of the following
discussion is based upon this text.
109. Id. at 393 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d. 350, 352-53 (4th Cir. 1941)).
110. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
111. JAMES ET AL., supra note 108, at 669.
